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This article considers how the pendulum metaphor can be applied to shifts in popular
opinion concerning the right to privacy. At times, the media portrays privacy as an
individualistic right, serving at the behest of criminals and terrorists. Every so often,
however, an event occurs that starkly reminds the public of the value of privacy.
Public opinion drives debate and this debate often leads to legal reform. The Church
Committee, formed in response to the Watergate scandal, is a classic example of the
effect the exposure of abuse can have on the regulation of privacy. Over time,
however, legislative gains in privacy protection have a tendency to erode. In
addition, extreme events, such as the terrorist attacks of 9/11, can cause the
pendulum to swing back to the opposite position. Following the exposure of mass
surveillance practices by Edward Snowden, the world has, once again, been
questioning government surveillance activities. This article seeks to consider the
transatlantic impact of the National Security Agency revelations. Transparency is
highlighted as a crucial regulating force on excessive government interference with
privacy rights.
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Introduction
The concept of a swinging pendulum frequently serves as a political metaphor, illustrat-
ing oscillations from one policy position to another over time.1 The metaphor borrows
from the scientific principle that the restoring force of gravity, combined with the mass
of a pendulum, will cause it to swing back and forth indefinitely. In addition to
being used to portray electoral swings,2 trends in criminal justice,3 and education
© 2014 Taylor & Francis
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1See, for example, M Lebo and H Norpoth, ‘The PM and the Pendulum: Dynamic Forecasting of
British Elections’ (2007) 37 BJ Pol S 71; S Ranchod-Nilsson, ‘Gender Politics and the Pendulum
of Political and Social Transformation in Zimbabwe’ (2006) 32 JSAS 49; B Jackson, The Challenge
of Domestic Intelligence in a Free Society: A Multidisciplinary Look at the Creation of a US Domestic
Counterterrorism Intelligence Agency (Rand Corporation, 2009) 90, 112.
2M Harrop, ‘The Pendulum Swings: The British Election of 1997’ (1997) 32 Gov’t & Oppos 305; S
Severinghaus, ‘Mongolia in 2000: The Pendulum Swings Again’ (2001) 41 Asian Surv 61; D Collier,
‘The Ideal Pendulum Swing: From Rhetoric to Reality’ (2008) 13 BJCL 175.
3GMiller, ‘Watching the Correctional Pendulum Swing’ (1993) 62 FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin 24;
D Spader, ‘Megatrends in Criminal Justice Theory’ (1985–1986) 13 AJCL 157; D Collier, ‘The Ideal
Pendulum Swing: From Rhetoric to Reality’ (2008) 13 BJCL 175; K Parker, ‘Coddling Not Allowed’
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reforms,4 the metaphor of the pendulum has been utilised by many to demonstrate how
public opinion regarding the balance between security and surveillance has tended to see–
saw at various points in history.5 The logic underlying this theory is that in times of crisis,
the government may curtail civil liberties in order to protect national security. Etzioni has
commented that once the threat has passed, the intrusive measures ‘can gradually be
rolled back.’6 While this understanding of the balance between the powers of the State
and the protection of civil liberties may place undue faith in the ability of societal
forces to correct the excesses of its government systems over time, it can be useful to
illustrate observable shifts in public opinion and subsequent developments in government
policy. Due to the secrecy of surveillance systems, the public often only learns of the true
nature of government activity following the actions of a whistle-blower, like Edward
Snowden. Due to this information deficit, the pendulum is only prone to swing back
in favour of greater protection of privacy rights once the relevant information enters
the public domain.
Often, the importance of privacy is weighed against the importance of national security.
This balancing can place an undue burden on the right to privacy, as a threat to privacy
appears remote in comparison to a threat to personal safety. Privacy, as a fundamental
right, has faced criticisms of varying degrees of severity. At the more moderate end of
the scale, Hixon has described privacy as being a right worth protecting, but not worth pro-
tecting ‘on the grand scale that claims for privacy are pressed today.’7 More negatively,
privacy has been described as a ‘cult’ that ‘rests on an individualist conception of
society.’8 In popular discourse, privacy is often wholly identified as a benefit to the individ-
ual, weighing against general social goods, such as security.9 Despite the vigorous protesta-
tions of civil liberties organisations a frequently made argument is that privacy is a
moribund right that people no longer need and is, in fact, an anachronistic value in
modern life.10 Predictably, the argument goes, in the war on terror and organised crime,
privacy is even less important. Popular culture is infected with an ‘us v. them’ mentality
Chicago Tribune (Chicago, 24 November 1999) <articles.chicagotribune.com/1999–11-24/news/
9911240048_1_discipline-psychotropic-greater-communication-and-education> accessed 10 October
2014.
4P Wolfe and L Poynor, ‘Politics and the Pendulum: An Alternative Understanding of the Case of
Whole Language as Educational Innovation’ (2001) 30 Educational Researcher 15–20; C Mellon,
‘Technology and the Great Pendulum of Education’ (1999) 32 JRCE 28; D Coulby, R Cowen and
C Jone, Education in Times of Transition (Psychology Press, 2000).
5D Clarke and E Neveleff, ‘Secrecy, Foreign Intelligence, and Civil Liberties: Has the Pendulum
Swung Too Far?’ (1984) 99 PSQ 493; P Pillar, ‘The Pendulum of Opinion on Security and
Privacy’ The National Interest (11 June 2013) <www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2013/06/09-
security-privacy-surveillance-phone-internet-terrorism-pillar> accessed 10 October 2014; O Kerr,
‘Technology, Privacy, and the Courts: A Reply to Colb and Swire’ 102 Mich L Rev 933; R
Matthew and G Shambaugh, ‘The Pendulum Effect: Explaining Shifts in the Democratic Response
to Terrorism’ (2005) 5 Analyses of Social Issues and Public Policy 223; D Solove, ‘Data Mining
and the Security-Liberty Debate’ (2008) 75 U Chi L Rev 343.
6A Etzioni, The Limits of Privacy 25 (Basic Books, 1999) 25; See D Solove, Nothing to Hide: The
False Trade-off between Privacy and Security (Yale University Press, 2011) 55–56.
7G Laurie, Genetic Privacy: A Challenge to Medico-legal Norms (CUP, 2002) 47. R Hixson, Privacy
in a Public Society (OUP, 1987) 4.
8H Arndt, ‘The Cult of Privacy’ (1949) 21 AQ 68, 70–71; S Benn, ‘Privacy, Freedom, and Respect for
Persons’ in F Schoeman (ed), Philosophical Dimensions of Privacy (CUP, 1984) 303.
9See D Solove, Understanding Privacy (Harvard University Press, 2008) 10.
10J Rule, Privacy in Peril (OUP, 2007) xi.
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where the idea of protecting privacy rights is viewed by many as abhorrent pandering to
terrorists and criminals.11
Such complacency is occasionally checked, however. Often this task is performed by
the press, such as when the News of the World phone hacking scandal was exposed.12
When reports emerged exposing the phone hacking of celebrities, politicians, and
members of the Royal Family, there was mild public interest.13 When the recognisable
and relatable figure of Millie Dowler and her family became part of the story, however,
the increased level of outrage was palpable.14 Revelations like this make people stop and
think, turn the intangible into the material and remind people that privacy is a right
worth protecting. This article considers how non-voluntary transparency has influenced sur-
veillance policy in the past by examining the aftermath of the Watergate scandal and the
Bush administration warrantless wiretapping scandal. The Edward Snowden revelations
have, once again, brought the question of privacy to the fore of public consciousness. By
refusing to view this latest scandal in isolation, this article gains insight from previous
experiences. This article considers the effect of the Snowden revelations on public
opinion and assesses the implications of the disclosures from the European perspective.
Transparency is highlighted as a crucial regulating force on excessive government interfer-
ence with privacy rights.
Watergate and the Church Committee
During the Cold War, public anxiety was high and the threat posed by the Soviet Union was
keenly felt. With the Cold War being waged through technological and political compe-
tition, the importance of espionage and the fear of foreign spies rose.15 This environment
enabled the rapid expansion of the powers and capabilities of government investigative
agencies.16 In spite of the fact that public perception tends to associate the abuses
exposed following the Watergate scandal solely with the Nixon administration, such a
11C Gearty, ‘Reflections on Civil Liberties in an Age of Counterterrorism’ (2003) 41 OHLJ 185, 187.
12The Guardian, Phone Hacking: How the Guardian Broke the Story (Guardian Books, 2011).
13N Davies, ‘Phone Hacking Was Rife at News of the World, Claims New Witness’ The Guardian
(London 8 September 2010) <www.theguardian.com/media/2010/sep/08/phone-hacking-news-of-
the-world-witness> accessed 10 October 2014; S Lanville and H Mulholland, ‘Met Police Refuse
to Reopen Phone-hacking Inquiry’ The Guardian (London 9 July 2009) <www.theguardian.com/
politics/2009/jul/09/police-refuse-reopen-tapping-inquiry> accessed 10 October 2014; N Davies,
‘Phone Hacking Approved by Top News of the World Executive – New Files’ The Guardian
(London 15 December 2010) <www.theguardian.com/media/2010/dec/15/phone-hacking-sienna-
miller-evidence> accessed 10 October 2014.
14N Davies and A Hill, ‘Missing Milly Dowler’s Voicemail Was Hacked by News of the World’ The
Guardian (London 5 July 2011) <www.theguardian.com/uk/2011/jul/04/milly-dowler-voicemail-
hacked-news-of-world> accessed 10 October 2014; P Wilkinson, ‘Milly Dowler: Murdered School-
girl at Heart of Hacking Scandal’ CNN (Atlanta, USA 29 November 2012) <edition.cnn.com/2012/11/
28/world/europe/milly-dowler-profile/> accessed 10 October 2014.
15F Schwarz and A Huq, Unchecked and Unbalanced: Presidential Power in a Time of Terror (New
Press, 2007) 14–24. For discussion of the exaggerated domestic Communist threat, see H Johnson,
The Age of Anxiety: McCarthyism to Terrorism (Harcourt, 2005) and R Rovere, Senator Joe
McCarthy (Harcourt, 1959).
16A Cinquegrana, ‘The Walls (and Wires) have Ears: The Background and First Ten Years of the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978’ (1989) 137 U Pa L Rev 793, 797–798; W Diffie
and S Landau, Privacy on the Line: The Politics of Wiretapping and Encryption (MIT Press, 1998)
155–165; D Solove, ‘Reconstructing Electronic Surveillance Law’ (2003–2004) 72 Geo Wash L
Rev 1264.
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perception is misleading. While Nixon and Hoover certainly abused their powers, admin-
istrations from Roosevelt’s through to Nixon’s all sanctioned overly broad investigations
and lawless conduct.17
In spite of this, Watergate was a crucial moment in American history.18 Following the
exposure of President Nixon’s commandeering of the US intelligence agencies in order to
investigate his political opponents, there was an unprecedented backlash against the expan-
sion of Executive power.19 In addition to the resignation of President Nixon, the year of
1974 saw the introduction of the Privacy Act to govern the collection, maintenance, and
use of personally identifiable information about individuals by federal agencies.20 In the
following year, the US Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with
Respect to Intelligence Activities set to work under the chairmanship of Senator Frank
Church (Church Committee).21
Among the many examples of abuses perpetrated by the US intelligence agencies – and
exposed by the Church Committee – were a panoply of intrusive and covert measures
directed against Martin Luther King.22 Martin Luther King was just one victim among
many who were targeted under the government Counter Intelligence Program (COUNTEL-
PRO) that was set up in order to investigate political dissent.23 Other targets included
members of the American Communist Party and opponents of the war in Vietnam.24 In
addition, the Church Committee reported that surveillance had been directed at figures as
diverse as Albert Einstein, Muhammad Ali, certain members of Congress, and the
Supreme Court.25 The Church Committee was severely critical of the intelligence agencies,
pointing out that certain techniques used by the agencies were contrary to the ‘the ideals
which have given the people of this country and of the world hope for a better, fuller,
17Hearings Before the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelli-
gence Activities of the US Senate (1976) 94th Congress Volume 2, 10. When Roosevelt began his
term as President in 1933, the FBI was comprised of 353 agents. On his death in 1945, the number
of agents had increased to 4380. R Kessler, The Bureau: The Secret History of the FBI (St
Martin’s, 2002) 57; D Solove, ‘Reconstructing Electronic Surveillance Law’ (2003–2004) 72 Geo
Wash L Rev 1264, 1272. F Schwarz and A Huq, Unchecked and Unbalanced: Presidential Power
in a Time of Terror (New Press, 2007) 24.
18F Emery, Watergate (Simon and Schuster, 1995); L Liebovich, Richard Nixon, Watergate, and the
Press: A Historical Retrospective (Greenwood Publishing Group, 2003).
19K Olson, Watergate: The Presidential Scandal that Shook America (University Press of Kansas,
2003).
20Privacy Act 1974 <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/USCODE-2012-title5/pdf/USCODE-2012-
title5-partI-chap5-subchapII-sec552a.pdf> accessed 10 October 2014.
21R Miller (ed), US National Security, Intelligence and Democracy: From the Church Committee to
the War on Terror (Routledge, 2008) 1.
22For example, the FBI intercepted King’s telecommunications and installed surveillance devices in
his hotel room. F Schwarz and A Huq, Unchecked and Unbalanced: Presidential Power in a Time of
Terror (New Press, 2007) 21–24. See also C Gentry, J Edgar Hoover: The Man and the Secrets (WW
Norton, 1991) 140–142.
23R Powers, Secrecy and Power: The Life of J Edgar Hoover (Free Press, 1987), 339; D Solove,
‘Reconstructing Electronic Surveillance Law’ (2003–2004) 72 Geo Wash L Rev 1264, 1274.
24D Solove, ‘Reconstructing Electronic Surveillance Law’ (2003–2004) 72 Geo Wash L Rev 1264,
1274.
25D Solove, ‘Reconstructing Electronic Surveillance Law’ (2003–2004) 72 Geo Wash L Rev 1264,
1274; C Gentry, J Edgar Hoover: The Man and the Secrets (WW Norton, 1991) 140–142; F
Jerome, The Einstein File: J Edgar Hoover’s Secret War Against the World’s Most Famous Scientist
(St Martin’s Press, 2002).
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fairer life.’26 Senator Frank Church highlighted the ever-present risk of excessive executive
power when he pointed out that extensive surveillance capabilities could at any time, ‘be
turned around on the American people and no American would have any privacy left,
such is the capability to monitor everything: telephone conversations, telegrams, it
doesn’t matter. There would be no place to hide.’ In a striking statement, Church warned
America of the potential end result of excessive executive power and opacity:
I don’t want to see this country ever cross the bridge. I know the capacity that is there to make
tyranny total in America, and we must see to it that this agency and all agencies that possess this
technology operate within the law and under proper supervision, so that we never cross over
that abyss. That is the abyss from which there is no return.27
The Church Committee identified several significant flaws in the operation of the US intel-
ligence services. Among the most significant flaws highlighted were the presence of ambig-
uous laws which granted wide discretion to the members of the executive branch, the
expectation of permanent secrecy among inside parties, and weak congressional oversight
resulting in a lack of accountability.28 Each of these weaknesses reinforced each other by
providing a hospitable environment for overreach where ambiguity and opacity were the
norm. When individuals never expect their actions to be reviewed, they are unlikely to
expend much time assessing the legal implications of their chosen course of action. Each
of these lessons remains relevant today.
Out of the Watergate scandal, the findings of the Church Committee, and public dissa-
tisfaction with executive abuse grew an inter-branch compromise in the shape of the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 1978 (FISA).29 FISAwas created in order to regulate
the collection of intelligence on foreign powers within the USA.30 The Act was designed
under the reasoning that a more permissive regime is justifiable when collecting foreign
intelligence.31 This approach was supported by the traditional view that enemies of the
26Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations, ‘Intelligence Activities and the Rights of
Americans’ Bk II v, Senate Resolution 21 (27 January 1975) 285 <http://www.aarclibrary.org/
publib/church/reports/ir/pdf/ChurchIR_6_Addenda.pdf> accessed 10 October 2014. F Schwarz and
A Huq, Unchecked and Unbalanced: Presidential Power in a Time of Terror (New Press, 2007) 23.
27J Bamford, ‘The Agency That Could Be Big Brother’ New York Times (New York 25 December
2005) <www.nytimes.com/2005/12/25/weekinreview/25bamford.html?pagewanted=print> accessed
10 October 2014; ——, ‘High-Level US Government Officials Have Warned for 40 Years that
Mass Surveillance Would Lead to Tyranny in America’ (3 July 2013) Washington’s Blog <www.
washingtonsblog.com/2013/07/top-experts-have-warned-for-50-years-that-mass-surveillance-would-
lead-to-tyranny-in-america.html> accessed 10 October 2014.
28F Schwarz and A Huq, Unchecked and Unbalanced: Presidential Power in a Time of Terror (New
Press, 2007) 5, 23–24, 45–47.
29According to a Senate Report, ‘This legislation is in large measure a response to the revelations that
warrantless electronic surveillance in the name of national security has been seriously abused.’ Senate
Report Number 95–604 (1977), 7. R Dawson, ‘Shifting the Balance: The DC Circuit and the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978’ (1993) 61 Geo Wash L Rev 1380, 1386; D Solove, ‘Recon-
structing Electronic Surveillance Law’ (2003–2004) 72 Geo Wash L Rev 1264, 1277. F Schwarz
and A Huq, Unchecked and Unbalanced: Presidential Power in a Time of Terror (New Press,
2007) 50, 53. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub L No 95–511, 92 Stat 1783.
30D Solove, ‘Reconstructing Electronic Surveillance Law’ (2003–2004) 72 Geo Wash L Rev 1264,
1289. P Swire, ‘The System of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance’ (2003–2004) 72 Geo Wash L
Rev 1306.
31A different regime was to operate in the domestic context, for example the Federal Wiretap Act of
1968 applied to the interception of domestic conversations using telephone lines. This Act was later
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state are more likely to be foreigners and that in any case foreigners are not entitled to the
same protection as American citizens. FISA created a special court of federal district court
judges and this court was assigned the authority to grant foreign intelligence surveillance
orders.32 Hearings in the FISA Court are held ex parte and in secret.33 According to the
original understanding, FISA was to serve as the ‘exclusive means’ to conduct electronic
foreign intelligence surveillance.34
While the FISA procedure was never a glowing example of transparent procedure,
having been evocatively described as being held in a ‘cipher-locked windowless,
secure room on the top floor of the Department of Justice,’ its original incarnation was
a significant achievement in the light of how jealously executive authorities guard their
control over surveillance operations.35 Prior to the report of the Church Committee,
excessive secrecy had facilitated the continual expansion of the executive branch by inhi-
biting the corrective force of public opinion. The exposure of the extent of the executive
abuse led to significant reform that brought the balance between security and civil liber-
ties closer to equilibrium.
While the public reaction and legislative change that arose following the Church Com-
mittee report supports the pendulum theory, the pendulum metaphor is, of course,
inadequate to fully illustrate the ebb and flow of surveillance policy. History has shown
us that when new safeguards and procedures are set in place, there is quite often a trickle
effect where the executive begins to find methods to work around any new restrictions.36
Schwarz points out that while the findings of the Church Committee led to significant
reform, ‘many of the same flaws began to reappear’ by the mid-1980s.37 In line with the
pendulum metaphor, however, a national crisis can have a significant precipitating effect
and can catalyse a forceful swing of the pendulum back in favour of security and surveil-
lance at the expense of the right to privacy. In recent times, the response to the attacks of 9/
11 is the epitome of this phenomenon.
9/11 and the aftermath
The effects of the attacks of 9/11 were not exclusively felt in New York, Washington, or the
USA; there was global aftershock. In spite of this, however, the USAwas the direct target
and it is, perhaps, not surprising that since the attacks of 9/11, the US Government has
become obsessed with ‘ferreting out national security threats’ with modern surveillance
techniques.38 While the 9/11 Commission reported numerous failures of coordination
between intelligence agencies in the build up to the attacks, the most significant failure
updated by the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) of 1986. The ECPA has been
amended several times since its introduction. FISA has also been amended many times since the orig-
inal enactment. See B Hund, ‘Disappearing Safeguards: FISA Nonresident alien “loophole” is uncon-
stitutional’ (2007) 15 Cardozo J Int’l & Comp L 269.
3250 USC §1803(a). A review court (The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review) was also
established to hear government appeals 50 USC §1803(b).
3350 USC § 1093(a).
34Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) of 1978, 50 USC § 1809 (2000 & Supp II 2002). W
Banks, ‘The Death of FISA’ (2007) 91 Minn L Rev 1209, 1215.
35R Turkington and A Allen, Privacy Law: Cases and Materials (West Group, 2002) 213.
36F Schwarz and A Huq, Unchecked and Unbalanced: Presidential Power in a Time of Terror (New
Press, 2007) 56.
37Ibid 6.
38C Slobogin, Privacy at Risk (University of Chicago Press, 2007) 3.
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highlighted was the ‘day-to-day gaps in information sharing.’39 In spite of this, the executive
seized the opportunity to engage in a large-scale expansion of their surveillance powers.
FISA, as originally designed, struck an arguable balance between the need of the execu-
tive branch to conduct foreign intelligence surveillance for the purposes of security with its
duty to respect the Constitutional requirements under the Fourth Amendment.40 The
post-9/11 climate of fear and patriotism provided the executive branch with the perfect
opportunity to push through legislative reform, most notably through the introduction of
the PATRIOTAct.41 The PATRIOTAct amended FISA in several substantial ways. Amend-
ments included broadening the scope of email search warrants, intercepting telephone con-
versations through the use of roving wiretaps, and increasing the flow of foreign intelligence
information between agencies.42 An amendment of particular concern was the departure
from the ‘primary purpose’ requirement. Section 218 of the PATRIOT Act expanded
FISA authorisation for surveillance that had foreign intelligence collection as its primary
purpose to include FISA authorisation of surveillance which had the collection of foreign
intelligence as a ‘significant purpose.’43 This is problematic as one of the original defences
made of the relaxed FISA regime was that it had limited applicability.44 Following the intro-
duction of the PATRIOTAct, the government could take advantage of the looser framework
provided by FISA even when foreign intelligence gathering was ‘only one of the goals.’45
Even though the PATRIOTAct was not designed in response to the attacks of 9/11, the
Act was rushed through Congress in a climate of public fear and political pressure that
39The 9/11 Commission Report (WW Norton, 2004) 266–267, 271, 339–352. F Schwarz and A Huq,
Unchecked and Unbalanced: Presidential Power in a Time of Terror (New Press, 2007) 59.
40The Fourth Amendment of the US Bill of Rights protects
[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,against unrea-
sonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and noWarrants shall issue, but upon prob-
able cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
41Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and
Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub L No 107056, 115 Stat 272.
42See N Henderson, ‘The Patriot Act’s Impact on the Government’s Ability to Conduct Electronic
Surveillance of Ongoing Domestic Communications’ (2002) 52 Duke L J 179; J Whitehead and S
Aden, ‘Forfeiting “Enduring Freedom” For “Homeland Security”: A Constitutional Analysis of the
USA PATRIOT Act and the Justice Department’s Anti-Terrorism Initiatives’ (2001–2002) 51 Am
U L Rev 1081–1133, 1083; D Solove, ‘Reconstructing Electronic Surveillance Law’ (2003–2004)
72 Geo Wash L Rev 1264, 1278; D Solove and M Rotenberg, Information Privacy Law (Aspen Pub-
lishers, 2003) 341–344.
43§218 (amending 50 USC. §1804 (a)(7)(B)). A consistent defense of the relaxed FISA procedures
has been the externality of the threat. The Executive reminds the public that any restriction on
rights is solely in the context of the war on terrorism, drawing comfortable allusions of wartime
enemies in a manner that would not affect the life and rights of the average American citizen. It is
clear however that the boundaries have been blurred, and Executive expansion under the guise of
emergency protection has serious privacy infringing consequences for the average citizen. An impor-
tant aspect of FISA is the dichotomy created between non-resident aliens and citizens. It was deter-
mined that non-resident aliens were more likely than citizens to be officers of a foreign power and
therefore more likely to be sources of foreign intelligence information and more likely to be visiting
the United States for a limited time. See B Hund, ‘Disappearing Safeguards: FISA Nonresident alien
“loophole” is unconstitutional’ (2007) 15 Cardozo J Int’l & Comp L 269.
44D Solove, ‘Reconstructing Electronic Surveillance Law’ (2003–2004) 72 Geo Wash L Rev 1264,
1290.
45Ibid 1291.
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facilitated its speedy adoption.46 Prior to the tragic events that took place on 9/11, the
Department of Justice had drafted a comprehensive proposal for ‘updating’ the surveillance
laws, elements of which had been rejected in Congress a number of times previously.47 The
introduction of the PATRIOT Act could be seen as the executive capitalising on the public
mood in a time of severe national stress in order to push through a ‘wish list.’48 Taking
advantage of a sense of emergency, the executive managed to expand its power as Congress
relinquished its role in legislation and leadership. At the time of its enactment, the
PATRIOT Act was subjected to criticism on the grounds that it represented an excessive
power grab on behalf of the executive. While there were divergent opinions on the
issue,49 Hund went so far as to describe the remaining safeguards designed to prevent
the abusive wiretapping of non-resident aliens as a mere ‘filing requirement.’50
In spite of the concessions Congress made in enacting the PATRIOTAct and amending
FISA, and the satisfaction expressed by the Bush administration with the new rules,51
additional and covert executive expansion was to be uncovered in 2005. In the
New York Times, James Risen and Eric Lichtblau exposed how the NSA had been circum-
venting the updated FISA procedures under a classified presidential order.52 It was revealed
46B Howell, ‘SevenWeeks: The Making of the USA PATRIOTAct’ (2003–2004) 72 GeoWash L Rev
1145; R Ericson and K Haggerty, The New Politics of Surveillance and Visibility (University of
Toronto Press, 2006) 148.
47See D Solove, ‘Reconstructing Electronic Surveillance Law’ (2003–2004) 72 Geo Wash L Rev
1264, 1277 and O Kerr, ‘Internet Surveillance Law After the USA Patriot Act: The Big Brother
that Isn’t’ (2003) 97 North Western University Law Review 607, 637.
48D Solove, ‘Reconstructing Electronic Surveillance Law’ (2003–2004) 72 Geo Wash L Rev 1264,
1277.
49Orin Kerr has suggested that the criticism of the PATRIOTAct has been overblown. O Kerr, ‘Inter-
net Surveillance Law After the USA Patriot Act: The Big Brother that Isn’t’ (2003) 97 North Western
University Law Review 607, 637. For a contrasting opinion see J Whitehead and S Aden, ‘Forfeiting
“Enduring Freedom” For “Homeland Security”: A Constitutional Analysis of the USA PATRIOTAct
and the Justice Department’s Anti-Terrorism Initiatives’ (2001–2002) 51 Am U L Rev 1081–1133. A
Washington Post editorial described the public debate over the fate of the law as having ‘fallen victim
to election-year demagoguery. Critics talk about it as though it were a comprehensive menace, while
President Bush and Attorney General John D. Ashcroft often treat skepticism of it as softness in the
war on terror.’ Editorial, ‘More Patriot Act Games’ Washington Post (Washington July 18 2004)
<www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A58330-2004Jul17.html> accessed 10 October 2014;
A Etzioni, How Patriotic is the Patriot Act?: Freedom Versus Security in the Age of Terrorism (Rou-
tledge, 2004).
50B Hund, ‘Disappearing Safeguards: FISA Nonresident Alien “Loophole” is Unconstitutional’
(2007) 15 CJICL 169, 174.
51As pointed out by Greenwald, ‘Bush expressly asked for changes to the law in the aftermath of 9/11,
thereafter praised the law, and misled Congress and the American people into believing that they were
complying with the law.’ G Greenwald, ‘NSA legal arguments’ Unclaimed Territory (19 February
2006) <glenngreenwald.blogspot.ie/2006/02/nsa-legal-arguments.html> accessed 10 October 2014.
52While the programme was defended by the Bush administration, the administration also attempted
to reassure the public that the NSA only had the power to intercept international calls and emails of
people in very limited circumstances. In spite of this, it was later uncovered that large telecommuni-
cations companies had been providing the NSA with the call records of millions of Americans. L
Cauley, ‘NSA Has Massive Database of American Phone Calls’ USA Today (McClean, USA 11
May 2006 <http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2006-05-10-nsa_x.htm> accessed 10
October 2014; J Bamford, ‘The Agency That Could Be Big Brother’ New York Times (New York
25 December 2005) <http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/25/weekinreview/25bamford.html?adxnnl=
1&pagewanted=all&adxnnlx=1405868637-YQJ01BZqxvR76MAwGpHX1Q> accessed 10 October
2014.
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that the NSA had been conducting surveillance without warrants or other judicial
approval.53 While certain aspects of the updated FISA regime were cause for concern fol-
lowing the PATRIOT Act, ‘at least the procedures were prescribed by law.’54
Instead of assuming responsibility for the warrantless wiretapping programme, the
executive branch defended its decision to circumvent even the heavily amended version
of FISA.55 The administration defended the programme as a necessary ‘early warning
system’ justified by statute under the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF)56
and the US Constitution through the Commander in Chief clause in Article II.57 The war-
rantless wiretapping programme was described as an ‘unprecedented expansion in presi-
dential power’58 and was widely criticised for lacking the Fourth Amendment safeguards
of individualised suspicion and judicial oversight.59 The secret programme undermined
the existing legal structure as information gathered through the warrantless programme
was often subsequently used to obtain FISA Court approval.60 When used this way, the
FISA regime served as mere white-wash for the warrantless programme. Notwithstanding
the criticism, however, the scandal failed to penetrate the public consciousness to the degree
that might be expected and there was scant evidence of a swing of the pendulum in favour
of greater protection of civil liberties.
Instead of engaging in a discussion of privacy-enhancing reform, such as that engaged
upon following the report of the Church Committee, Congress enacted the Protect America
Act 2007 in what has been described as ‘a few days of feverish activity immediately before
its summer recess.’61 The Protect America Act 2007 was designed to provide a legal basis
for the activities that the executive had, up until that time, been conducting in secret.62 The
Protect America Act of 2007 removed the warrant requirement for government surveillance
53J Risen and E Lichtblau, ‘Bush Lets US Spy on Callers Without Courts’ New York Times (New York
16 December 2005) http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/16/politics/16program.html?pagewanted=
all&_r=0 accessed 10 October 2014; D Eggen and C Lane, ‘On Hill, Anger and Calls for Hearings
Greet News of Stateside Surveillance’ Washington Post (Washington 17 December 2005) http://
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/12/16/AR2005121601825.html> accessed
10 October 2014.
54The regime had been criticised for operating under excessive secrecy, for conducting ex parte pro-
ceedings, and for failing to provide notice of surveillance to targets. W Banks, ‘The Death of FISA’
(2007) 91 Minn L Rev 1209, 1233.
55Letter fromWilliamMoschella to Pat Roberts and others (22 December 2005) 3 <http://www/usdoj.
gov/ag/readingroom/surveillance6.pdf> accessed 10 October 2014. The Executive argued that the sur-
veillance only covered situations where one end of the communication is a known or reasonably sus-
pected affiliate of al Qaeda. In the light of the deceptive way the Administration had expanded its
powers, these assurances were unconvincing in the absence of any independent verification outside
the executive branch.
56Pub L No 107-40, 115 Stat 224 (2001).
57The claimed inherent power comes from a ‘perceived historical responsibility for overseeing collec-
tion of foreign intelligence in times of conflict and peace.’ Even if one was to accept the legitimacy of
this broad authority, however, the ‘vague criteria used to select targets’ and the minimal internal
review provided were difficult to justify. See K Wong, ‘The NSA Terrorist Surveillance Program’
43 HJL 517, 522, 527.
58K Wong, ‘The NSA Terrorist Surveillance Program’ 43 HJL 517, 518.
59B Nolan and others, ‘On NSA Spying: A Letter to Congress’ New York Review of Books (New York
9 February 2006) <http://www.nybooks.com/articles/18650> accessed 10 October 2014.
60J Risen, State of War (Free Press, 2006) 54.
61P Schwartz, ‘Reviving Telecommunications Surveillance Law’ (2008) 75 U Chi L Rev 287, 306.
62S Bellovin and others, ‘Risking Communications Security: Potential Hazards of the Protect America
Act’ (2008) 6 Security and Privacy Magazine 24, 33.
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of foreign intelligence targets ‘reasonably believed’ to be outside of the USA.63 Schwartz
opines that the exceptions introduced by the Protect America Act swallowed the general
rule requiring FISA Court approval.64
In addition to legislating for the warrantless surveillance programme, Congress further
capitulated to the demands of the executive branch by legislating to inhibit oversight by the
court system. Following the 2005 revelations, legal proceedings were initiated across the
country in an attempt to make the telecommunications companies liable for their involve-
ment in the warrantless surveillance programme.65 The lawsuits were an avenue for the
public to investigate the details of the programme, but the Bush administration sought retro-
active immunity for the telecommunications companies.66 With the granting of immunity to
the telecommunications companies, the public was again prevented from discovering what
its own government was doing with their information.67
It is clear that the 2005 disclosures did not result in an abrupt swing in surveillance
law and policy, and the balance between surveillance programmes and the protection of
privacy did not experience the ‘correction’ that might be expected. One explanation for
the lack of popular outrage may simply be that the terror of the 11 September attacks was
still too fresh and the public remained happy to accept greater restriction of their liberties
in exchange for a perception of greater security. A related explanation may be the lack of
personalisation of the issue in the national conversation. Not only did the whistle-blowers
remain in the background of the story,68 the surveillance was largely perceived as some-
thing that affected the ‘other’ in society.69 Whether that ‘other’ was represented by
63Later, the FISA Amendments Acts of 2008 and 2012 reauthorised many provisions of the Protect
America Act.
64P Schwartz , ‘Reviving Telecommunications Surveillance Law’ (2008) 75 U Chi L Rev 287, 308.
By giving the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence the power to authorise tele-
communications companies to acquire intelligence ‘reasonably believed to be outside the United
States’ the Protect America Act ‘stripped’ the FISA Court of jurisdiction. Recent Developments,
‘Protect America Act of 2007’ (2008) 45 HJL 581, 581.
65Previously a court order would have been sought by a telecommunication company before disclos-
ing customer calling data to the Government. See J Klosek, The War on Privacy (Praeger, 2007) 39–
40; See for example, Hepting v AT&T 439 F Supp 2d. 974, 984 (ND Cal 2006).
66FISA Amendments Act 2008; Z Keller, ‘Big Brother’s Little Helpers: Telecommunication Immu-
nity and the FISA Amendment Act of 2008’ (2009) 70 Ohio St L J 1215, 1230; Recent Develop-
ments, ‘Protect America Act of 2007’ (2008) 45 HJL 581, 593; M Wagner, ‘Warrantless
Wiretapping, Retroactive Immunity, and the Fifth Amendment’ (2009–2010) 78 Geo Wash L
Rev 204, 205.
67D Eggen, ‘Immunity for Telecoms May Set Bad Precedent, Legal Scholars Say’ Washington Post
(Washington 22 October 2007) <www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/10/21/
AR2007102101041.html> accessed 10 October 2014; D Solove, ‘The New Foreign Intelligence Sur-
veillance Act’ Concurring Opinions (11 July 2008) <http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/
2008/07/the_new_foreign.html> accessed 10 October 2014; G Greenwald, ‘US Supreme Court Fina-
lizes Gift of Immunity to the TelecomGiants’Washington Post (Washington 10 October 2012) <www.
theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/oct/10/supreme-court-telecoms-win-immunity> accessed 10
October 2014.
68M Isikoff, ‘The Whistleblower Who Exposed Warrantless Wiretaps’ Newsweek (New York 13
December 2008) <www.newsweek.com/whistleblower-who-exposed-warrantless-wiretaps-82805>
accessed 10 October 2014.
69A poll conducted by CBS News found that the majority of Americans disapprove of the NSA’s sur-
veillance programmes when directed at ‘ordinary’ Americans, but not when directed at terrorist sus-
pects. S Dutton and others, ‘Most Disapprove of Gov’t Phone Snooping of Ordinary Americans’ CBS
News (New York 12 June 2013) <www.cbsnews.com/news/most-disapprove-of-govt-phone-
snooping-of-ordinary-americans/> accessed 10 October 2014; E Brown, ‘Most Americans Object
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suspected terrorists or simply by foreigners and aliens living in the USA, the general
public remained comfortable with the concept of ‘if you have nothing to hide, you
have nothing to fear.’70 Of course, several key facts distinguish the circumstances of
the 2005 revelations from those that emerged in 2013 through the disclosures by
Edward Snowden.
The Snowden revelations
It is notable in itself that the NSA revelations of 2013 are commonly referred to as the
‘Snowden revelations.’ Edward Snowden, the former NSA intelligence contractor and
CIA employee, has firmly entered the public consciousness.71 Snowden made a deliber-
ate choice to not only disclose thousands of documents to selected members of the press,
but also chose to expose his identity as the whistle-blower. According to Snowden, he
felt he had ‘an obligation to explain why I’m doing this and what I hope to
achieve.’72 Snowden has also been considered in his actions; as pointed out by Green-
wald, it would be difficult for the government to characterise Snowden as either
‘unstable’ or ‘naive.’73
It is also important to highlight that the Snowden revelations exposed the vastness of
NSA surveillance operations. Snowden was reported as stating that ‘[t]he NSA specifically
targets the communications of everyone. It ingests them by default. It collects them in its
system and it filters them and analyzes them and it measures them and it stores them.’74
The ‘collect it all’mentality of the intelligence agency personalised the issue for many indi-
viduals.75 This perception was fuelled with headlines such as ‘NSA collecting phone
records of millions of Verizon customers daily’ and ‘NSA Uses Angry Birds, Candy
Crush to Spy on Americans.’76 The PRISM programme was one of the first stories that
To NSA Surveillance Against “Ordinary” Citizens, But Not Terrorism Suspects: Poll’ International
Business Times (New York 11 June 2013) <www.ibtimes.com/most-americans-object-nsa-
surveillance-against-ordinary-citizens-not-terrorism-suspects-poll-1302793> accessed 10 October
2014.
70See J Monaghan, ‘Terror Carceralism: Surveillance, Security Governance and De/civilization’
(2013) 15 P&S 3–22; D Solove, ‘“I’ve Got Nothing to Hide” and Other Misunderstandings of
Privacy’ (2007) 44 San DLR 745.
71A Peterson, ‘Edward Snowden, Celebrity?’ The Washington Post (Washington 7 March 2014)
<www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2014/03/07/edward-snowden-celebrity/> accessed
10 October 2014.
72G Greenwald, No Place to Hide: Edward Snowden, the NSA, and the US Surveillance State
(Metropolitan Books, 2014) 18.
73Ibid 31.
74A Davidson, ‘Edward Snowden, The NSA Leaker, Comes Forward’ New Yorker (New York 9 June
2013) <www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/closeread/2013/06/edward-snowden-the-nsa-leaker-
comes-forward.html> accessed 10 October 2014.
75O Garcia, ‘NSA Leaks About Spying Are Scaring Some Americans Away From The Internet’ Huf-
fington Post (New York 22 July 2013) <www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/07/22/nsa-leaks-spying-
internet_n_3633510.html> accessed 10 October 2014.
76R Levinson-Waldman, ‘The Double Danger of the NSA’s “Collect It All” Policy on Surveillance’
The Guardian (London 10 October 2013) <www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/oct/10/
double-danger-nsa-surveillance> accessed 10 October 2014; E Nakashima and J Warrick, ‘For
NSA Chief, Terrorist Threat Drives Passion to “Collect It All”’ Washington Post (Washington 14
July 2013) <www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/for-nsa-chief-terrorist-threat-drives-
passion-to-collect-it-all/2013/07/14/3d26ef80-ea49-11e2-a301-ea5a8116d211_story.html> accessed
10 October 2014; J Mick, ‘NSA Uses Angry Birds, Candy Crush to Spy on Americans’ Daily
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emerged from the Snowden leaks and the press coverage of the programme revealed how
PRISM enabled the NSA to compel the provision of personal information from popular and
pervasive US companies, including Facebook, Microsoft, Apple, Yahoo! and Google.77
Later reports further documented how personally intrusive surveillance could be.78 For
example, it was discovered that the NSA cooperated with Britain’s GCHQ in order to inter-
cept webcam images of millions of individuals not suspected of any wrongdoing.79
The Snowden revelations led to popular protest and rallies across the USA.80 The
general sense that NSA surveillance has the potential to affect all citizens, and not just ter-
rorists or criminals, is illustrated by the following statement made at an anti-surveillance
rally, ‘I am 10. And I don’t believe I should worry about every word that I write in my
emails to my friends.’81 While polls have shown that a majority of individuals remain gen-
erally supportive of surveillance programmes, a notable shift in public perception has been
detected following the Snowden disclosures.82 Significantly, in a Pew Research Center poll
Tech (New York 28 January 2014) <www.dailytech.com/NSA+Uses+Angry+Birds+Candy+Crush
+to+Spy+on+Americans/article34211.htm> accessed 10 October 2014; G Greenwald, ‘NSA Collect-
ing Phone Records of Millions of Verizon Customers Daily’ The Guardian (London 6 June 2013)
<www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/nsa-phone-records-verizon-court-order> accessed 10
October 2014.
77The NSA had gained access to private user content, such as private messages, photos, and videos.
G Greenwald and E MacAskill, ‘NSA Prism Program Taps in to User Data of Apple, Google and
Others’ The Guardian (London 7 June 2013) <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/
us-tech-giants-nsa-data> accessed 10 October 2014; I Brown and D Korff, ‘Foreign Surveillance:
Law and Practice in a Global Digital Environment’ (2014) 3 EHRLR 243, 243. Initial reporting
on the PRISM programme overstated the reach of the programme. In spite of this, the PRISM pro-
gramme appeared to strike a chord with the public. M Masnick, ‘Privacy and Civil Liberties Board
Mostly Unconcerned About PRISM Or Backbone Tapping By NSA’ Tech Dirt (2 July 2014)
<https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20140702/06315727755/privacy-civil-liberties-board-mostly-
unconcerned-about-prism-backbone-tapping-nsa.shtml> accessed 10 October 2014.
78G Greenwald and E MacAskill, ‘NSA Prism Program Taps in to User Data of Apple, Google and
Others’ The Guardian (London 7 June 2013) <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/us-
tech-giants-nsa-data> accessed 10 October 2014; R Lempert, ‘PRISM and Boundless Informant: Is
NSA Surveillance a Threat?’ Brookings (13 June 2013) <http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/
posts/2013/06/13-prism-boundless-informant-nsa-surveillance-lempert> accessed 10 October 2014;
O Garcia, ‘NSA Leaks About Spying Are Scaring Some Americans Away From The Internet’ Huf-
fington Post (New York 22 July 2013) <www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/07/22/nsa-leaks-spying-
internet_n_3633510.html> accessed 10 October 2014.
79S Ackerman and J Ball, ‘Optic Nerve: Millions of Yahoo Webcam Images Intercepted by GCHQ’
The Guardian (London 28 February 2014) <www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/27/gchq-nsa-
webcam-images-internet-yahoo> accessed 10 October 2014.
80A Fitzpatrick, ‘Thousands to Join “Restore the Fourth” Anti-NSA Rallies’ Mashable (2 July 2013)
<mashable.com/2013/07/02/restore-the-fourth/> accessed 10 October 2014; In addition, the disclos-
ures spurred the creation of a movement – comprising technology companies and civil liberties groups
– that has united in an attempt to improve encryption standards. K Zetter, ‘Anti-surveillance Move-
ment Wants to “Reset the Net”’Wired (San Francisco 7 May 2014) <www.wired.co.uk/news/archive/
2014-05/07/reset-the-net> accessed 10 October 2014.
81D Kuriakose, ‘1984 Day Sees “Restore the Fourth” Protests Across the Country’ Mashable
(New York 5 August 2013) <mashable.com/2013/08/04/1984-day> accessed 10 October 2014.
82A Pew Research Center poll conducted in June 2013 found that 56% of Americans believe that the
NSA’s collection and tracking of telephone records is an acceptable way for the government to inves-
tigate terrorism. In the same poll, however, 41% of those polled were found to believe the tactics to be
unacceptable. See——, ‘Majority Views NSA Phone Tracking as Acceptable Anti-terror Tactic’ Pew
Research Center (10 June 2013) <www.people-press.org/2013/06/10/majority-views-nsa-phone-
tracking-as-acceptable-anti-terror-tactic/> accessed 10 October 2014.
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conducted following the first Snowden leaks,83 47% of individuals stated that they were
concerned that anti-terrorism policies were excessively restricting civil liberties and 35%
stated that they were more concerned that more restrictions would be necessary to ade-
quately protect national security.84 This is a notable reversal of opinion from previous
polls conducted by the Pew Research Center.85 One possible explanation for the shift in
opinion may be the reportage detailing the generalised nature of the surveillance pro-
grammes. Privacy has the tendency to be viewed as an intangible right until it affects the
individual personally and the Snowden revelations served as a stark reminder that the
average citizen is not immune from government surveillance.
This logic may also explain the heightened outrage of international leaders when they
discovered that their communications had also been subjected to surveillance.86 Senator
Dianne Feinstein provides another interesting example of how personal exposure to surveil-
lance can alter our understanding of privacy. Following the Snowden revelations, Feinstein –
a staunch defender of the intelligence agencies – contended that information was only col-
lected on ‘bad guys.’87 Her opinion changed somewhat when she discovered that the com-
puters of Senate staffers had been under scrutiny.88 Accordingly, in addition to drawing
83Telephone interviews were conducted on 1480 adults living across all 50 US states and the District of
Columbia in the summer of 2013.——, ‘Majority Views NSAPhone Tracking asAcceptable Anti-terror
Tactic’ Pew Research Center (10 June 2013) <www.people-press.org/2013/06/10/majority-views-nsa-
phone-tracking-as-acceptable-anti-terror-tactic/> accessed 10 October 2014; G Greenwald, ‘Major
Opinion Shifts, in the US and Congress, on NSA Surveillance and Privacy’ The Guardian (London 29
July 2013) <www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/jul/29/poll-nsa-surveillance-privacy-pew>
accessed 10 October 2014.
84——, ‘Few See Adequate Limits on NSA Surveillance Program’ Pew Research Center (26 July
2013) <http://www.people-press.org/2013/07/26/few-see-adequate-limits-on-nsa-surveillance-
program/> accessed 10 October 2014; See G Greenwald, ‘Major Opinion Shifts, in the US and Con-
gress, on NSA Surveillance and Privacy’ The Guardian (London 29 July 2013) <www.theguardian.
com/commentisfree/2013/jul/29/poll-nsa-surveillance-privacy-pew> accessed 10 October 2014.
85As recently as 2010, 47% of those polled said that they were more concerned that government pol-
icies ‘have not gone far enough to adequately protect the country,’while 32% said that they were more
concerned that ‘they have gone too far in restricting the average person’s civil liberties.’ C Doherty,
‘Balancing Act: National Security and Civil Liberties in Post-9/11 Era’ Pew Research Center (7 June
2013) <www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2013/06/07/balancing-act-national-security-and-civil-
liberties-in-post-911-era/> accessed 10 October 2014;——, ‘Few See Adequate Limits on NSA Sur-
veillance Program’ Pew Research Center (26 July 2013) <http://www.people-press.org/2013/07/26/
few-see-adequate-limits-on-nsa-surveillance-program/> accessed 10 October 2014.
86I Traynor and P Lewis, ‘Merkel compared NSA to Stasi in heated encounter with Obama’ The Guar-
dian (London 17 December 2013) <www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/17/merkel-compares-nsa-
stasi-obama> accessed 10 October 2014; J Borger, ‘Brazilian President: US Surveillance a “Breach of
International Law”’ The Guardian (London 24 September 2013) <www.theguardian.com/world/
2013/sep/24/brazil-president-un-speech-nsa-surveillance> accessed 10 October 2014; J Wolverton,
‘World Leaders React to NSA Surveillance of Their Phone Calls’ The New American (25 October
2013) <www.thenewamerican.com/usnews/foreign-policy/item/16808-world-leaders-react-to-nsa-
surveillance-of-their-phone-calls> accessed 10 October 2014; M Pengelly, ‘NSA Listed Merkel
Among Leaders Subject to Surveillance – Report’ The Guardian (London 29 March 2014) <www.
theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/29/nsa-merkel-leaders-surveillance-documents-snowden>
accessed 10 October 2014.
87T Mak and B Everett, ‘Dianne Feinstein on NSA: “It’s Called Protecting America”’ Politico
(Washington, 6 June 2013) <www.politico.com/story/2013/06/dianne-feinstein-on-nsa-its-called-
protecting-america-92340.html> accessed 10 October 2014.
88Feinstein is the Chairman of the US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence; M Masnick, ‘Senator
Feinstein Finally Finds Surveillance To Get Angry About: When It Happened To Her Staffers’ Tech
Dirt (San Francisco 11 March 2014) <https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20140311/07212926527/
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attention to current surveillance practices, the Snowden revelations increased public aware-
ness of privacy issues. Just as there had been calls for investigation and open evaluation fol-
lowing the Watergate leaks, there were calls for reform in the wake of the Snowden
revelations. By shining light on the covert practices of the NSA, Snowden empowered the
public to express whether or not they were satisfied with the – previously secret – status quo.
Legal responses to the Snowden revelations
Following the Watergate scandal, the Church Committee was formed to investigate the sur-
veillance activities of intelligence agencies. Several reforms were introduced following the
Church Report, with FISA being the most significant legislative change. The first Snowden
leak was published in the summer of 2013 and documents continue to be reviewed and
reported on by journalists, such as Glenn Greenwald, who have been entrusted with
copies of the NSA files.89 While President Obama may claim that he had called for a
review of US surveillance operations prior to the Snowden revelations, it is undeniable
that the Snowden leaks have given significant momentum to surveillance reform.90
Despite much discussion of reform in the USA, the tangible results have been underwhelm-
ing thus far.
In August 2013, President Obama appointed a Review Group on Intelligence and Com-
munications Technologies to assess the surveillance regime in advance of reform propo-
sals.91 The review group published a report in December 2013 and recommended several
reforms of the current system.92 In January 2014, President Obama addressed some of
senator-feinstein-finally-finds-surveillance-to-get-angry-about-when-it-happened-to-her-staffers.shtml>
accessed 10 October 2014; A Napolitano, ‘Freedom for me, but not for thee –Dianne Feinstein, the CIA
and you’ Fox News (New York 20 March 2014) <www.foxnews.com/opinion/2014/03/20/freedom-for-
me-but-not-for-thee-dianne-feinstein-cia-and/> accessed 10 October 2014. On learning that the CIA had
Searched the Computers of Senate offices without authorisation, Feinstein expressed ‘grave concerns.’G
Miller, E O’Keefe and A Goldman, ‘Feinstein: CIA Searched Intelligence Committee Computers’
Washington Post (Washington 11 March 2014) <www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/
feinstein-cia-searched-intelligence-committee-computers/2014/03/11/982cbc2c-a923-11e3-8599-ce729
5b6851c_story.html> accessed 10October 2014; HAbdullah, ‘Feinstein says CIASpied on Senate Com-
puters’ CNN (Atlanta, USA 12 March 2014) <edition.cnn.com/2014/03/11/politics/senate-cia/index.
html?iref=allsearch> accessed 10 October 2014.
89The first article covered the NSA collection of Verizon phone records. G Greenwald, ‘NSA Collect-
ing Phone Records of Millions of Verizon Customers Daily’ The Guardian (London 6 June 2013)
<www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/nsa-phone-records-verizon-court-order> accessed 10
October 2014; T Kludt, ‘Greenwald Says “There’s A Lot More Coming”, Argues NSA Revelations
Don’t Harm Security’ Talking Points Memo (Washington 15 July 2014) <talkingpointsmemo.com/
livewire/mccain-boston-bombings-prove-sen-rand-paul-wrong-on-terror> accessed 10 October 2014.
90Office of the Press Secretary, ‘Remarks by the President in a Press Conference’ White House (9
August 2013) <www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/08/09/remarks-president-press-
conference> accessed 10 October 2014.
91A Peterson, ‘Obama’s “Outside Experts” for NSA Review Are Former Intel and White House Staf-
fers’ Washington Post (Washington 22 August 2013) <www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/
wp/2013/08/22/obamas-outside-experts-for-nsa-review-are-former-intel-and-white-house-staffers/>
accessed 10 October 2014.
92Report and Recommendations of The President’s Review Group on Intelligence and Communi-
cations Technologies, ‘Liberty and Security in a Changing World’ 12 December 2013 <apps.
washingtonpost.com/g/page/world/nsa-review-boards-report/674/> accessed 10 October 2014.
Additional – more critical – review was carried out by the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight
Board (PCLOB). In January 2014 the PCLOB reported that the s.215 bulk collection of telephone
records program ‘lacks a viable legal foundation under s.215, implicates constitutional concerns
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the concerns raised in the report and stated that he would work with Congress to pursue
appropriate reforms to the bulk metadata collection programme under s.215 of the
PATRIOTAct.93 In February, changes were made by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court on the request of the administration.94 Since the Snowden revelations, legislative
reform efforts have been numerous, but the USA Freedom Act has emerged as the most
viable proposal.95 While the USA Freedom Act has been ‘watered down’ from its original
incarnation introduced in October 2013,96 it was passed by the US House of Representa-
tives in May 2014.97 In order to become law, the USA Freedom Act must be approved
by the Senate and must be signed by the President.98
While US reform efforts remain in flux it is interesting to note the global repercussions
of the Snowden revelations. Initially, the global impact was dominated by the privacy of
under the First and Fourth Amendments, raises serious threats to privacy and civil liberties as a policy
matter, and has shown only limited value.’ Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, ‘Report on
the Telephone Records Program Conducted under s.215 of the USA PATRIOTAct and on the Oper-
ations of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court’ 23 January 2014, 16 <www.pclob.gov/All
Documents/Report on the Telephone Records Program/PCLOB-Report-on-the-Telephone-Records-
Program.pdf> accessed 10 October 2014. The PCLOB recommended that the government end the
bulk collection of telephone records programme. This recommendation was rejected by the Obama
administration. According to the White House Press Secretary administration officials ‘simply dis-
agree with the board’s analysis on the legality of the program.’ J Hattem, ‘Holder dismisses NSA
Report’ The Hill (21 January 2014) <thehill.com/policy/technology/196313-holder-dismisses-nsa-
report> accessed 10 October 2014. In July 2014, the PCLOB released a second report which found
that the s.702 programme – concerned with the collection of foreign digital information – was
‘legal and effective’ in protecting national security. Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board,
‘Report on the Surveillance Program Operated Pursuant to s.702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveil-
lance Act’ 2 July 2014, 161 <www.pclob.gov/All Documents/Report on the Section 702 Program/
PCLOB-Section-702-Report-PRE-RELEASE.pdf> accessed 10 October 2014.
93Office of the Press Secretary, ‘Remarks by the President on Review of Signals Intelligence’ The
White House (17 January 2014) <www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/01/17/remarks-
president-review-signals-intelligence> accessed 10 October 2014.
94——, ‘FISC Approves Government’s Request to Modify Telephony Metadata Program’ Office of
the Director of National Intelligence (6 February 2014) <www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/press-
releases/198-press-releases-2014/1013-foreign-intelligence-surveillance-court-approves-government-s-
request-to-modify-telephony-metadata-program> accessed 10 October 2014.
95S Davies, ‘A Crisis of Accountability’ The Privacy Surgeon (June 2014) 72 <https://cippic.ca/
uploads/Snowden_at_one_year-global_survey.pdf> accessed 10 October 2014.
96——, ‘Leahy & Sensenbrenner Join To Introduce USA FREEDOM Act’ Jim Sensenbrenner (Press
Release 29 October 2013) <sensenbrenner.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=
356911> accessed 10 October 2014; D Kravets, ‘NSA reform falters as House passes gutted USA
Freedom Act’ Ars Technica (22 May 2014) <atarstechnica.com/tech-policy/2014/05/nsa-reform-
falters-as-house-passes-gutted-usa-freedom-act/> accessed 10 October 2014; E Swarztrauber,
‘Privacy Advocates tell Congress: Fix Watered-down USA Freedom Act!’ Tech Freedom (19 June
2014) <techfreedom.org/post/89310684884/privacy-advocates-tell-congress-fix-watered-down-usa>
accessed 10 October 2014; T Eddlem, ‘USA Freedom Act Gutted Before House Passage; Heads to
Senate’ New American (26 May 2014) <www.thenewamerican.com/usnews/constitution/item/
18340-usa-freedom-act-gutted-before-house-passage-heads-to-senate> accessed 10 October 2014.
97D Roberts and K McVeigh, ‘NSA Surveillance Reform Bill Passes House by 303 Votes to 121’ The
Guardian (London 22 May 2014) <www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/22/nsa-reform-bill-usa-
freedom-act-passes-house> accessed 10 October 2014.
98J Eggerton, ‘USA Freedom Act Gets Tough Reception in Senate’ Broadcasting & Cable (Washing-
ton 6 June 2014) <www.broadcastingcable.com/news/washington/usa-freedom-act-gets-tough-
reception-senate/131607> accessed 10 October 2014; A Byers, ‘Hill Surveillance Reform: Time Is
Not Its Side’ Politico (Washington 17 July 2014) <www.politico.com/story/2014/07/hill-
surveillance-reform-time-109015.html> accessed 10 October 2014.
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Heads of States99 and the sanctity of trade talks.100 As the revelations continued, it
became clear that the NSA – and by extensions its Five Eyes partners – had far greater
access to the world’s communications than previously surmised.101 While the initial
outrage and debate in many European states has not been followed by successful legisla-
tive reform,102 the Snowden revelations continue to cause ripples at the European Union
level. In the wake of the revelations, the EU Commissioner for Home Affairs, Cecilia
Malmstrom, threatened to suspend USA access to European financial and travel data if
the USA failed to show that the USA respected EU data protection rules.103 In addition
to launching an inquiry into the Snowden revelations,104 the Parliament of the EU has
had Snowden address the Parliament through video conference technology.105 Other
developments at the EU level – discussed below – cannot be so unambiguously traced
to the Snowden revelations. In spite of a more indirect relationship between these
recent developments and the disclosures, it seems clear that the privacy-conscious
environment that Snowden helped to create is hospitable to the strengthening of
privacy and data protection in the EU.
99S Romero and R Archibold, ‘Brazil Angered Over Report N.S.A. Spied on President’ New York
Times (New York 2 September 2013) <www.nytimes.com/2013/09/03/world/americas/brazil-
angered-over-report-nsa-spied-on-president.html?_r=0> accessed 10 October 2014; J Borger and
others, ‘G20 Summits: Russia and Turkey React with Fury to Spying Revelations’ The Guardian
(London 17 June 2013) <www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/17/turkey-russia-g20-spying-gchq>
accessed 10 October 2014; ——, ‘“No Longer in the Cold War”: Merkel Infuriated by US Spying’
Der Spiegel (Hamburg 1 July 2013) <www.spiegel.de/international/world/merkel-furious-at-us-
spying-and-eu-to-check-offices-for-bugs-a-908859.html> accessed 10 October 2014.
100I Traynor, L Osborne and J Doward, ‘Key US-EU Trade Pact under Threat after More NSA Spying
Allegations’ The Guardian (London 30 June 2013) <www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/30/nsa-
spying-europe-claims-us-eu-trade> accessed 10 October 2014.
101P Hamilos, ‘Spain Summons US Ambassador over Claim NSATracked 60 m Calls a Month’ The
Guardian (London 28 October 2013) <www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/28/spain-summons-us-
ambassador-nsa-calls> accessed 10 October 2014; G Greenwald, No Place to Hide: Edward
Snowden, the NSA, and the US Surveillance State (Metropolitan Books, 2014) 118–119; G Corera,
‘Spying Scandal: Will the “Five Eyes” Club Open up?’ BBC (London 29 October 2013) <www.
bbc.com/news/world-europe-24715168> accessed 10 October 2014; N Hopkins and J Borger ‘Exclu-
sive: NSA Pays £100 m in Secret Funding for GCHQ’ The Guardian (London 1 August 2013) <www.
theguardian.com/uk-news/2013/aug/01/nsa-paid-gchq-spying-edward-snowden> accessed 10
October 2014.
102C Kerry, ‘Missed Connections: Talking With Europe About Data, Privacy, And Surveillance’ Center
for Technology Innovation at Brookings (May 2014) <www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/
papers/2014/05/20%20europe%20privacy%20surveillance%20kerry/kerry_europefreetradeprivacy.pdf>
accessed 10 October 2014; M Holland, ‘Europe’s Reaction to the Snowden Revelations: Indifference,
Resignation and Complete Bewilderment’ C’t (26 February 2014) <www.heise.de/ct/artikel/Europe-s-
reaction-to-the-Snowden-revelations-Indifference-resignation-and-complete-bewilderment-2118252.
html> accessed 10 October 2014.
103A Croft, ‘EU Threatens to Suspend Data-sharing with US over Spying Reports’ Reuters (5 July
2013) <www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/05/usa-security-eu-idUSL5N0FB1YY20130705> accessed
10 October 2014.
104Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, ‘Report on the US NSA surveillance pro-
gramme, surveillance bodies in various Member States and their impact on EU citizens’ fundamental
rights and on transatlantic cooperation in Justice and Home Affairs(2013/2188(INI))’ (21 February
2014) <www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=REPORT&reference=A7-2014-0139&
language=EN> accessed 10 October 2014.
105G Schmitz, ‘European Parliament: Snowden Will Make Video Appearance’ Der Spiegel (Hamburg
12 December 2013) <www.spiegel.de/international/world/edward-snowden-to-make-video-
appearance-to-european-parliament-a-938725.html> accessed 10 October 2014.
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One area of the law that has received increased attention in the aftermath of the
Snowden revelations is data protection. The Convention for the Protection of Individuals
with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data (Convention No. 108) was initially
developed by the Council of Europe in 1981 in response to significant developments in
information and communications technology.106 In an effort to bring about harmonisation
of data protection regulation within the internal market, the European Community adopted
Directive 95/46/EC on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of per-
sonal data and on the free movement of such data in 1995.107 The status of the right to
data protection as a fundamental right in Europe has been significantly enhanced with
the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty and the now binding nature of Article 8 of the
EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (EU Charter).108
With the exponential growth in online communications, the manner in which the associ-
ated user data is protected has become increasingly important. A vast amount of both traffic
and content communications data is stored by private companies, such as Microsoft and
Google, and the ability to access this data is clearly valued by the investigative arm of gov-
ernment. Due to the belief that current data protection law is out of date, reforms of the law
have been proposed for several years.109 While the reform process had appeared stalled,
fresh impetus for reform was created following the Snowden revelations.110 The former
EU Commissioner for Justice and Fundamental rights, Vivien Reding has frequently
106Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Proces-
sing of Personal Data (ETS No 108) (Strasbourg, 28.I.1981); Council of Europe, Explanatory Report
to the Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal
Data (ETS No 108). <http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Reports/Html/108.htm> accessed 10
October 2014; P Hustinx, ‘Data Protection in the European Union’ [2005] Privacy & Informatie
62; N Purtova, ‘Private law solutions in European data protection: Relationship to privacy, and
waiver of data protection rights’ (2010) 28 NQHR 179.
107Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the pro-
tection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such
data [1995] OJ L281.
108In addition to the Charter recognition of the right, an explicit legal basis for the right to the pro-
tection of personal data is now contained in Article 16 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the Euro-
pean Union. These developments place the right to data protection at the same level as the EU
Treaties.
109Commission Proposal for a Comprehensive Approach on Personal Data protection in the European
Union, COM (2010), 609/3 (11 November 2010) <http://ec.europa.eu/justice/news/consulting_public/
0006/com_2010_609_en.pdf> accessed 10October 2014; HCrowther, ‘TheDraft Data ProtectionRegu-
lation: Can We Start Counting our Chickens?’ (2014) 14 P & DP 7, 7;——, ‘Reding Rallies Troops to
Power Forward with Reform’ (2014) 14 Privacy & Data Protection 1, 1; J Leyden, ‘Call for Reform as
UK Data Protection Rules Turn 10’ The Register (16 July 2008) <www.theregister.co.uk/2008/07/16/
dpa_10/> accessed 10 October 2014; L Danagher, ‘An Assessment of the Draft Data protection Regu-
lation: Does it Effectively Protect Data?’ (2012) 3 EJLT; ——, ‘Privacy Reforms on the Horizon: A
Primer on Pending EU and US Privacy Proposals’ O’Melveny and Myers LLP (16 December 2010)
<www.omm.com/a-primer-on-pending-eu-and-us-privacy-proposals-12-16-2010/> accessed 10
October 2014.
110S Shuster, ‘EU Pushes for Stricter Data Protection After Snowden’s NSA Revelations’ Time
(New York 21 October 2013) <world.time.com/2013/10/21/e-u-pushes-for-stricter-data-protection-
after-snowden-nsa-revelations/> accessed 10 October 2014; Q Peel and J Fontanella-Khan, ‘Angela
Merkel Calls for EU-wide Agreement on Data Protection’ Financial Times (London 14 July 2013)
<www.ft.com/cms/s/0/7a4b26d8-eca6-11e2-a0a4-00144feabdc0.html’axzz36VlC7aS5> accessed 10
October 2014; ——, ‘EU: Reding Says Reforms Vital to Counter PRISM Data Access’ Data Gui-
dance (13 June 2013) <www.dataguidance.com/dataguidance_privacy_this_week.asp?id=2046>
accessed 10 October 2014.
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referenced the Snowden revelations when endorsing data protection reform.111 An example
of this is found in her assertion that US companies, such as Facebook and Google, should
also be subjected to European data protection law and her statement that European ministers
must ‘give a positive answer to Snowden’s wake-up call.’112 While the reform efforts have
not been unhindered,113 Vivien Reding has asserted that ‘the data protection reform is on
track – it is on the right track.’114
In spite of the importance the EU places on data privacy and data protection, the EU has
also introduced legislative measures that have been criticised as detrimental to privacy.115
The Data Retention Directive mandates that member states must retain all telecommunica-
tions traffic data for between six months and two years.116 In April 2014, the Court of
Justice of the European Union (CJEU) found the directive to be in breach of the EU
111——, ‘EU: Reding Says Reforms Vital to Counter PRISM Data Access’ Data Guidance (13 June
2013) <www.dataguidance.com/dataguidance_privacy_this_week.asp?id=2046> accessed 10
October 2014; ——, ‘“Thank You Mr Snowden”, Says EU’s Reding’ Luxemburger Wort (Luxem-
bourg 20 September 2013) <www.wort.lu/en/international/thank-you-mr-snowden-says-eu-s-reding-
523bdfa4e4b0c159be9abbba> accessed 10 October 2014; A Napolitano, ‘An Accidental Ally For
the European Union: “Thank You, Mr. Snowden” Says European Commission VP Reding in
Hangout Debate’ Tech President (9 January 2014) <techpresident.com/news/wegov/24653/
accidental-ally-european-union-’thank-you-mr-snowden’-says-european-commission-vp-reding>
accessed 10 October 2014; K Fiveash, ‘EU Ministers Respond Sleepily to Viv Reding’s “Snowden
Wake-up Call” on Data Protection’ The Register (9 June 2014) <www.theregister.co.uk/2014/06/
09/viv_reding_justice_council_of_ministers_data_protection/> accessed 10 October 2014.
112J Fioretti, ‘EU Says Firms like Google and Facebook must Meet Privacy Rules’ Reuters (6 June
2014) <uk.reuters.com/article/2014/06/06/us-eu-dataprotection-idUKKBN0EH1ER20140606>
accessed 10 October 2014.
113J Burn-Murdoch, ‘Europe Deadlocked over Data Protection Reform’ The Guardian (London 12
August 2013) <www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2013/aug/12/europe-data-protection-directive-
eu> accessed 10 October 2014.
114In an important sign of progress in May, the Council agreed its position concerning the application
of the new data protection rules to countries outside the EU. At this stage, the Council must still agree
its position on the full text. Once the Council has adopted its position it can then negotiate with the
European Parliament, which adopted its position on the full text in March. Council of the European
Union, ‘Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data
(General Data protection Regulation)–Partial General Approach on Chapter V’ (28 May 2014)
<http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%2010349%202014%20INIT> accessed
10 October 2014; Council of Europe, ‘Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and
of the Council on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and
on the free movement of such data (General Data protection Regulation)-Outcome of the European
Parliament’s first reading’ (27 March 2014) <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=
TA&reference=P7-TA-2014-0212&language=EN&ring=A7-2013-0402> accessed 10 October
2014; M Cross, ‘New European data protection law “on track”’ Law Society Gazette (1 July 2014)
<www.lawgazette.co.uk/law/new-european-data-protection-law-on-track/5041971.article> accessed
10 October 2014; S Peers, ‘Reforming EU Data Protection Law: the Council Takes Its First Baby
Steps’ EU Law Analysis (13 June 2014) <eulawanalysis.blogspot.ie/2014/06/reforming-eu-data-
protection-law.html> accessed 10 October 2014.
115V Shannon, ‘Data Retention: Europe’s Plan to Track Phone and Net Use’Der Spiegel (Hamburg 20
February 2007) <www.spiegel.de/international/data-retention-europe-s-plan-to-track-phone-and-net-
use-a-467475.html> accessed 10 October 2014.
116Directive 2006/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 on the
Retention Of Data Generated or Processed in Connection with the Provision of Publicly Available
Electronic Communications Services or of Public Communications Networks and Amending Direc-
tive 2002/58/EC [2006] OJ L-105/54.
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Charter.117 While the Advocate General had previously opined that the Directive was
incompatible with the EU Charter,118 the strength of the language in the decision
reached by the Court of Justice was unexpected. The Court pointed out that the Directive
had general application and required the collection of data on ‘all persons and all means of
electronic communication as well as all traffic data without any differentiation, limitation or
exception being made.’119 Accordingly, the Court found the directive to be disproportion-
ate. This decision represents a clear statement of intent on behalf of the Court of Justice,
particularly in the light of it being the first major European ruling on surveillance following
the Snowden revelations.120
In what could be interpreted as a thinly veiled reference to the Snowden revelations, the
Court stated that
the directive does not require that the data be retained within the EU. Therefore, the directive
does not fully ensure the control of compliance with the requirements of protection and security
by an independent authority, as is, however, explicitly required by the Charter. Such a control,
carried out on the basis of EU law, is an essential component of the protection of individuals
with regard to the processing of personal data.121
The implication of this statement appears to be that legal systems outside the EU cannot be
trusted to provide adequate protection of personal data. This statement has significant
implications for multinationals that move information between the EU and other states.
The Snowden revelations revealed how the NSA has the capability to access user infor-
mation held by US technology companies through programmes such as PRISM and it is
likely that this fact influenced the strong position taken by the Court of Justice on the
matter.122
The landmark ruling on data retention in April was followed by another important
privacy decision by the Court of Justice in May in Google Spain SL Google Inc v
Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD), Mario Costeja González.123 The
117Joined Cases C-293/12 & C-594/12 Digital Rights Ireland and Seitlinger and Others [2014] WLR
(D) 164.
118AG Opinion in Joined Cases C-293/12 & C-594/12 Digital Rights Ireland and Seitlinger and
Others [2013] EUECJ C-293/12.
119Joined Cases C-293/12 & C-594/12 Digital Rights Ireland and Seitlinger and Others [2014] WLR
(D) 164 [57].
120T McIntyre, ‘Surveillance Judgment Is a Victory for Democracy’ Irish Independent (Dublin 10
April 2014) <www.independent.ie/opinion/analysis/surveillance-judgment-is-a-victory-for-
democracy-30172786.html> accessed 10 October 2014.
121Joined Cases C-293/12 & C-594/12 Digital Rights Ireland and Seitlinger and Others [2014] WLR
(D) 164 [68].
122Under the PRISM programme, the NSA compels electronic communications service providers to
provide the communications connected to certain ‘selectors’ related to non-US persons, such as email
addresses. Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, ‘Report on the Surveillance Program Oper-
ated Pursuant to Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act’ 2 July 2014, 7 <http://
www.wired.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/PCLOB-Section-702-Report-PRE-RELEASE.pdf>
accessed 10 October 2014.
123The facts of the case involved a Spanish national who had previously sold his house to pay off
social security debts. When his name was searched on Google, the search results included links to
two newspaper articles from 1998 discussing these issues. The Spanish national believed that his
name should no longer be associated with these prejudicial articles as he had since cleared his
debts. Case C-131/12 Google Spain SL Google Inc v Agencia Española de Protección de Datos
(AEPD), Mario Costeja González [2014] EUECJ C-131/12.
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Court of Justice found that a Spanish national was entitled to have ‘irrelevant’ Google
search results associated with his name removed. The Court of Justice relied on the 1995
Data Protection Directive in addition to the rights to privacy and protection of personal
data as guaranteed by the EU Charter.124 Unsurprisingly, Google and other online
businesses have expressed dismay at the decision.125 In its ruling, the Court of Justice
makes it clear that the individual right to privacy occupies a privileged position over the
business interests of private companies.126 While the Court also privileged the rights to
privacy and data protection above the access to information interests of internet users,
the Court clarified that the balance would depend on the nature of the information in ques-
tion and on the interest of the public in having that information.127
The fact that this ‘right to be forgotten’ ruling was delivered in the context of a significant
resurgence of public interest in privacy rights globally cannot be ignored. While the Snowden
revelations would not appear to have a direct relationship with the ‘right to be forgotten,’ the
leaks have led to the increased prominence of privacy issues in the public debate. The general
public is becoming increasingly conscious of the risks associated with data collection gener-
ally and as a result conditions are favourable for enhancing the protection of privacy across all
sectors of society. This view is shared by other commentators, including Paul Bernal who
remarks that, ‘[p]rivacy is becoming bigger and bigger news – and I have a strong feeling
that the Snowden revelations influenced the thinking of the ECJ in last week’s ruling, subcon-
sciously if nothing else.’128 Henry Farrell opines that while the decision of the Court of
Justice is not directly connected to the Snowden revelations, the controversy may have
empowered the Court to push for a more direct EU role in privacy.129
The Snowden revelations and the subsequent developments in EU case law have not
been unnoticed at the domestic level. In June, the Irish High Court candidly discussed
the impact the Snowden revelations have had on global privacy in Schrems v Data
124Following this ruling, if a European Union citizen believes that the search results delivered on the
basis of his or her name are inaccurate, irrelevant, excessive, or out of date, he or she can request that
the search engine erase those results. The search engine must conduct a balancing analysis to deter-
mine whether the search results comply with the principles of Data protection. If the search engine
refuses to erase the offending search results, the individual is entitled to approach the relevant national
authority who – if Data protection law requires – could compel the search engine to remove the search
results in question.
125D Hakim, ‘Right to Be Forgotten? Not That Easy’ New York Times (New York 29 May 2014)
<www.nytimes.com/2014/05/30/business/international/on-the-internet-the-right-to-forget-vs-the-
right-to-know.html?_r=0> accessed 10 October 2014; N Hirst, ‘Outcry over Right to Be Forgotten’
European Voice (15 May 2014) <www.europeanvoice.com/article/n-business3-nh/> accessed 10
October 2014; N Lomas, ‘Jimmy Wales Blasts Europe’s “Right To Be Forgotten” Ruling as a “Ter-
rible Danger”’ Tech Crunch (7 June 2014) <techcrunch.com/2014/06/07/wales-on-right-to-be-
forgotten/> accessed 10 October 2014.
126Case C-131/12 Google Spain SL Google Inc v Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD),
Mario Costeja González [2014] EUECJ C-131/12 [81].
127Ibid.
128P Bernal, ‘AWeek Not to Be Forgotten… .’ Paul Bernal’s Blog (19 May 2014) <https://paulbernal.
wordpress.com/category/right-to-be-forgotten/> accessed 10 October 2014. The Snowden revelations
have increased attention on data privacy issues in Europe. J Fioretti, ‘Google Removes First Search
Results after EU Ruling’ Reuters (26 June 2014) <reuters.com/article/2014/06/26/google-searches-
eu-idUKL6N0P749T20140626> accessed 10 October 2014.
129H Farrell, ‘Five Key Questions about the European Court of Justice’s Google Decision’ Washing-
ton Post (Washington 14 May 2014) <www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/05/
14/five-key-questions-about-the-european-court-of-justices-google-decision/> accessed 10 October
2014.
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Protection Commissioner.130 While considering a case against the Irish Data Protection
Commissioner for refusing to investigate Facebook, the High Court referred an essential
question of privacy law to the CJEU.131 The judgment of the High Court discussed the
Snowden revelations in detail and considered how the exposure of PRISM and the language
used by the Court of Justice in the Digital Rights Ireland v Minister for Communications
decision may have significantly altered the legal position.132 The decision of the High
Court cast doubt on the legality of the current ‘Safe Harbour’ rules that govern the transfer
of information between the EU and the USA. While a European Commission Decision
issued in 2000 recognises Safe Harbour as providing adequate protection for personal
data, the Irish High Court pointed out that the recent Snowden revelations have raised
serious questions about the effectiveness of the system.133 In addition, the High Court
drew attention to the fact that since the sanctioning of the Safe Harbour regime by the Com-
mission in 2000, Europe has seen the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty which made the
EU Charter legally binding.134 In reference to the findings of the Court of Justice in the
Digital Rights Ireland decision,135 the High Court stated that ‘it is not immediately apparent
how the present operation of the Safe Harbour regime can in practice satisfy the require-
ments of Article 8(1) and Article 8(3) of the Charter.’136 While the High Court judgment
explicitly recognised the abuses carried out by the US security authorities, it also acknowl-
edged that the US Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court provides some judicial over-
sight.137 An underlying message of the Digital Rights Ireland decision138 seems to be
echoed in the assertion by the Irish High Court that considerable legal difficulties are
posed by ‘the very fact that this oversight is not carried out on European soil.’139
In the light of this judgment from the Irish Court, and the recent judgments emerging
from the Court of Justice, this is clearly a crucial moment for data protection and
privacy in Europe. In spite of the absence of tangible legislative reform, the influence of
the Snowden revelations is difficult to deny and privacy advocates are emboldened.
While problems with the safe harbour regime had previously been acknowledged, the
heightened concern with the system illustrates how the Snowden revelations have increased
momentum. The renewed focus on privacy issues at the EU level appears to have been
130Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner [2014] IEHC 310.The case concerns the ongoing
attempt by Max Schrems to force the Data Protection Commissioner to investigate Facebook’s invol-
vement with the PRISM programme through Facebook’s transferring of personal data from Facebook-
Ireland to Facebook Headquarters in the US.
131Mr Justice Hogan referred a question to the CJEU, asking whether an office holder enforcing data
protection legislation (such as a Data Protection Commissioner) is bound by the Commission
Decision which found the Safe Harbour regime to be adequate, or whether the office holder may
conduct his or her own investigation of the matter taking into account the factual developments
that have occurred following the original publication of the Commission Decision in 2000.
Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner [2014] IEHC 310 [71].
132Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner [2014] IEHC 310 [10]-[18], [62]. Joined Cases C-293/12
& C-594/12 Digital Rights Ireland and Seitlinger and Others [2014] WLR(D) 164 (discussed above).
133Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner [2014] IEHC 310 [69]-[71].
134The EU Charter explicitly recognises both the right to respect for private life and the right to pro-
tection of personal data. Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner [2014] IEHC 310 [63].
135Joined Cases C-293/12 & C-594/12 Digital Rights Ireland and Seitlinger and Others [2014] WLR
(D) 164 [57] (discussed above).
136Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner [2014] IEHC 310 [62].
137Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner [2014] IEHC 310 [14].
138Discussed above.
139Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner [2014] IEHC 310 [62].
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driven by the transparency Snowden forced on the intelligence agencies. As a result of this
transparency, Europe is re-evaluating how it protects its data.
Transparency
Shortly after Snowden revealed himself as the source of the NSA documents, the concept of
the ‘Snowden effect’ was being discussed.140 This term captures how the transparency that
Snowden imposed on the intelligence agencies has sparked a public debate. Secrecy has
been described as ‘the boon companion of arbitrariness’ and transparency has been
called the ‘cornerstone’ of good governance with an important role to play in reducing
abuse and enhancing public confidence.141 It remains the case, however, that some
degree of secrecy is an essential feature of any surveillance system. Inevitably, such oper-
ational necessity can result in an information deficit. In a properly functioning democracy,
the public should have general awareness of its government’s surveillance practices.
According to Beetham, the basic principle of democracy is that,
the people have a right to a controlling influence over the public decisions and decision-makers,
and that they should be treated with equal respect and as of equal worth in the context of such
decisions. These could be called for short the principles of popular control and political equal-
ity, respectively. 142
Transparency is essential if the public is to make an informed decision on whether they are
satisfied with their government. In a representative democracy, the public needs information
if they are to campaign or vote for change. Transparency provides the citizen with more
opportunity to decide what degree of interference they perceive to be acceptable and
thereby empowers the citizen to demand change.
The revelations of the Church Committee demonstrated how ‘assumptions of everlast-
ing secrecy facilitated the abuses by the executive branch.’143 The lack of clear comment
from either the NSA or the President on the nature or extent of the programme following
the exposure of the warrantless wiretapping scandal in 2005 provides another example of
the secrecy that inhibits effective protection of the privacy rights.144 The change of heart
experienced by the Chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, Senator Diane Fein-
stein, following her learning that Senate computers had been spied on is indicative of the
utter failure of oversight in the US system. Subsequent to her initial staunch defence of
the intelligence agencies, she admitted that it had become clear to her that ‘certain surveil-
lance activities have been in effect for more than a decade and that the Senate Intelligence
140R McShane, ‘The Snowden Effect’ The Economist (London 10 August 2013) <www.economist.
com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2013/08/american-surveillance> accessed 10 October 2014; K Hill,
‘As “X-Keyscore” Revealed, Senators Criticize NSA Hoovering Of Phone Records’ Forbes (31
July 2013) <www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2013/07/31/senators-question-nsa-hoovering-of-
phone-records/> accessed 10 October 2014.
141L Lustgarten and I Leigh, In from the Cold: National Security and Parliamentary Democracy
(Clarendon Press, 1994) 22; V Mäntysalo, ‘The Role of Transparency and Recent Developments
in Finland’ (EGPA Conference, Bucharest 7–10 September 2011).
142D Beetham, ‘Democracy: Key Principles, Institutions and Problems’ in Democracy: Its Principles
and Achievements (Inter-Parliamentary Union, 1998) 21.
143F Schwarz and A Huq, Unchecked and Unbalanced: Presidential Power in a Time of Terror (New
Press, 2007) 45.
144Jacqueline Klosek, The War on Privacy (Praeger, 2007) 39.
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Committee was not satisfactorily informed.’145 The flaws in the system of oversight are
great when even the Chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee – a specially privileged
security insider – is in the dark as regards the actions of the intelligence agencies.
Typically, when rights are infringed by the government we seek protection in the courts.
There are practical problems in the area of surveillance and privacy that place a heavy
burden on the individual. Due to the secret nature of surveillance it is often difficult to ident-
ify a particular incident of infringement and an accompanying justiciable harm. As Donner
points out,
the clandestine character of intelligence operations, the difficulty of identifying the source of a
claimed abuse, handicaps the pursuit of a judicial remedy. And the ambiguity of the injury suf-
fered by the target, contrasted with the importance of the interest (the security of the nation
itself) asserted in defense of the challenged conduct increases a complainant’s burdens.146
In order to overcome these limitations, an alternative approachmust be taken if the powers of
the government are to remain in check. Full and informed debate of issues – both the threats
and the benefits – is an essential value in a democratic society, as it encourages participation
and proportionate decision-making.O’Brien points out that the ‘importance of privacy rights
in a democratic society demands that the privacy/security tension is fully debated in an open
and rational way, devoid insofar as is possible of rhetoric and sensationalism, with an assess-
ment of some of the difficulties.’147 Scepticism is a vital element in a democratic society and a
system of checks and balances can provide ameasure of control against excessive exertion of
power by the executive branch.148 Publicity through an openmedia and transparency of gov-
ernment actions are essential tools of control over government in a democratic society.149
While there are legitimate limitations on the type of transparency that is possible in the
surveillance context, the publication of surveillance statistics has the potential to offer valu-
able protection and transparency. Limited publication of statistics reporting the levels and
types of surveillance carried out by government authorities occurs in several countries,150
however, it is clear that the standards and methods by which statistics are compiled vary and
much reporting of statistics contains significant gaps.151 Regardless of this, if the limitations
and the processes behind the collection, compilation, and publication of surveillance stat-
istics are transparent, surveillance statistics can be a useful tool for interested parties to
keep the actions of their governments under scrutiny year on year.152 It is submitted that
the publication of comprehensive surveillance statistics lessens the impression of impunity
145P Lewis and S Ackerman, ‘NSA: Dianne Feinstein Breaks Ranks to Oppose US Spying on Allies’
The Guardian (London 29 October 2013) <www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/28/nsa-
surveillance-dianne-feinstein-opposed-allies> accessed 10 October 2014.
146See F Donner, The Age of Surveillance (Vintage Books, 1980) xii.
147M O’ Brien, ‘Law, Privacy and Information Technology: A Sleepwalk Through the Surveillance
Society?’ (2008) 17 ICTL 25, 35.
148G Marx, Undercover: Police Surveillance in America (University of California Press, 1989) 775.
See discussion in B Barber, The Logic and Limits of Trust (Rutgers University Press, 1983).
149A Westin, Privacy and Freedom (Atheneum, 1967) 24.
150Examples include the report of the Parliamentary Control Commission in Germany, the US
‘Wiretap Report,’ and the Annual Report of the Interception of Communications Commissioner in
the UK.
151P Schwartz, ‘Evaluating Telecommunications Surveillance in Germany: The Lessons of the Max
Planck Institute’s Study’ (2003–2004) 72 Geo Wash L Rev 1244, 1252.
152See ——, ‘FBI reporting concerning pen register/trap and trace statistics’ (2009) <http://epic.org/
privacy/wiretap/ltr_pen_trap_leahy_final.pdf> accessed 10 October 2014.
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among members of the executive branch and can act as a deterrent to abusive action. Most
crucially, statistics keep the public informed and enable the public to participate in the
debate and exert control on their government if necessary.
So while statistics have the potential to offer a vital public check, a statistic requirement
can also have a fatiguing effect on both the press and the public. In the worst case, statistics
can even serve as privacy theatre.153 This concept, coined by Paul Schwartz, suggests that
the existence of statistics can reassure individuals that ‘someone’ is keeping an eye on
things and as a result statistics could deter genuine engagement or vigorous investi-
gation.154 According to Schwartz, the collection of statistics can create a ‘myth of over-
sight.’155 In order to ensure that statistics are not inuring the public to the issue of
surveillance and are not being manipulated to give a false impression, another line of
defence is necessary, and it is submitted that the conscientious insider – who feels free to
act as a whistle-blower – can play this crucial role.
Whistle-blowers
Without the work and risks taken by whistle-blowers, the public may have never learned of
the contents of the Pentagon Papers, the warrantless wiretapping programme engaged by
the Bush administration, the use of waterboarding by the US government,156 or the NSA
programmes exposed by Snowden. While Snowden does not meet the current US legal
standard of whistle-blower, he does meet the ‘vernacular’ standard.157 In addition to engen-
dering discussion on the appropriate use of surveillance in modern society, Snowden has
also sparked a debate on the practice of whistle-blowing in the national security context.
In the context of this debate, he has been both ‘hailed as a whistle-blower and denounced
as a traitor.’158 Notably, a Quinnipac poll conducted in August 2013 found that the majority
of Americans view Snowden as a whistle-blower and not a traitor.159
In June 2013, Edward Snowden was charged with espionage and theft of government
property.160 While former President Jimmy Carter has stated that he would consider pardon-
ing Snowden if hewas found guilty of these charges, PresidentObamahasmade his divergent
opinion clear.161 The reality is that Snowden was fully aware of the risk he took by both
153P Schwartz, ‘Reviving Telecommunications Surveillance Law’ (2008) 75 U Chi L Rev 287, 288.
154Ibid.
155Ibid.
156S Shane, ‘Ex-Officer Is First From CIA to Face Prison for a Leak’ New York Times (New York 5
January 2013), <www.nytimes.com/2013/01/06/us/former-cia-officer-is-the-first-to-face-prison-for-
a-classified-leak.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0> accessed 10 October 2014.
157L Paquette, ‘The Whistleblower as Underdog: What Protection can Human Rights offer in Massive
Secret Surveillance?’ (2013) 17 IJHR 796, 798; S Vladec, ‘The Espionage Act and National Security
Whistleblowing After Garcetti’ (2008) 57 Am ULR 1531, 1533.
158J Stratford and T Johnston, ‘The Snowden ‘revelations’: Is GCHQ Breaking the Law?’ (2014)
EHRLR 129, 129.
159——, ‘Snowden Is Whistle-Blower, Not Traitor, U.S. Voters Tell Quinnipiac University National
Poll’ Quinnipiac University (1 August 2013) <www.quinnipiac.edu/news-and-events/quinnipiac-
university-poll/national/release-detail?ReleaseID=1930> accessed 10 October 2014.
160 ——, ‘US Files Criminal Charges Against NSAWhistleblower Edward Snowden’ The Guardian
(London 22 June 2013) <www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/22/us-charging-edward-snowden-
with-espionage> accessed 10 October 2014.
161S Sullivan, ‘Jimmy Carter Says HeWould Consider Pardoning Edward Snowden’Washington Post
(Washington 26 March 2014) www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-politics/wp/2014/03/26/jimmy-
carter-says-he-would-consider-pardoning-edward-snowden/ accessed 10 October 2014.
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exposing the NSA and coming forward publicly in his role as whistle-blower. According to
Snowden, he understood that he would be made to suffer for his actions, but he asserts that ‘I
will be satisfied if the federation of secret law, unequal pardon and irresistible executive
powers that rule the world that I love are revealed even for an instant.’162 Even though
Snowden understood that by exposing the NSA his life would ‘likely be over,’ he asserted
that he was ‘at peace with that’ as it was the ‘right thing to do.’163 This is a remarkable sacri-
fice to make voluntarily and it would seem imprudent to expect the average conscientious
insider to make such damaging personal choices in an effort to protect the public interest.
The acceptance of such personal risk appears even less likely when considered in the
context of the aggressive pursuit of whistle-blowers by the US Government in recent
times.164 The Obama administration has frequently used the Espionage Act – primarily
designed to prosecute treasonous information sharing with foreign enemies – against
several individuals acting as whistle-blowers.165 11 individuals in US history have been
charged under the Espionage Act for leaking classified information; seven of those prose-
cutions have occurred under President Obama.166
President Obama has argued that Snowden should have taken a different – less public –
approach,167 and has called for him to return to the USA and go to court to ‘make his case’
that ‘what he did is right.’168 The flaw in this argument is that, under the Espionage Act,
acting in the public interest is not a defence.169 Indeed, the Espionage Act does not dis-
tinguish between an individual acting as a whistle-blower or as a spy. In addition, the
law does not provide the opportunity to argue that the leaked information should never
162G Greenwald, E MacAskill, and L Poitras, ‘Edward Snowden: TheWhistleblower Behind the NSA
Surveillance Revelations’ The Guardian (London 10 June 2013) <http://www.theguardian.com/
world/2013/jun/09/edward-snowden-nsa-whistleblower-surveillance> accessed 10 October 2014.
163G Greenwald, No Place to Hide: Edward Snowden, the NSA, and the US Surveillance State (Metro-
politan Books, 2014) 18.
164S Shane, ‘US Pressing Its Crackdown Against Leaks’ New York Times (New York 17 June 2011)
<http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/18/us/politics/18leak.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0> accessed 10
October 2014; J Kiriakou, ‘Obama’s Abuse of the Espionage Act Is Modern-day McCarthyism’
The Guardian (London 6 August 2013) <www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/aug/06/
obama-abuse-espionage-act-mccarthyism> accessed 10 October 2014.
165R Moberly, ‘Whistleblowers and the Obama Presidency: The National Security Dilemma’ (2012)
16 EREPJ 51, 75–76.
166J Kiriakou, ‘Obama’s Abuse of the Espionage Act Is Modern-day McCarthyism’ The Guardian
(London 6 August 2013) <www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/aug/06/obama-abuse-
espionage-act-mccarthyism> accessed 10 October 2014.
167Office of the Press Secretary, ‘Remarks by the President on Review of Signals Intelligence’ The
White House (17 January 2014) <www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/01/17/remarks-
president-review-signals-intelligence> accessed 10 October 2014.
168Office of the Press Secretary, ‘Remarks by the President in a Press Conference’ White House (9
August 2013) <www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/08/09/remarks-president-press-
conference> accessed 10 October 2014.
169This is in spite of the fact that the lack of a public interest defence may render the statute uncon-
stitutional. H Edgar and B Schmidt, ‘The Espionage Statutes and Publication of Defense Information’
(1973) 73 Col LR 929. For a discussion of how recent developments may have narrowed the Consti-
tutional protection see S Vladec, ‘The Espionage Act and National Security Whistleblowing After
Garcetti’ (2008) 57 Am ULR 1531, 1531. Pentagon Papers whistle-blower, Daniel Ellsberg has cri-
ticised calls for Snowden to return and face trial as ‘either disingenuous or simply ignorant that current
prosecutions under the Espionage Act allow no distinction whatever between a patriotic whistle-
blower and a spy.’ D Ellsberg, ‘Daniel Ellsberg: Snowden Would Not Get a Fair Trial – and Kerry
is Wrong’ The Guardian (London 30 May 2014) <www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/
may/30/daniel-ellsberg-snowden-fair-trial-kerry-espionage-act> accessed 10 October 2014.
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have been withheld from the public.170 Accordingly, national security whistle-blowers are
denied the opportunity to defend their actions as just. In addition, the aggressive approach
of the Obama administration means that a national security whistle-blower is likely to be
subjected to extremely harmful treatment once arrested. Potential whistle-blowers will be
aware of the recent handling of leakers, such as Private Chelsea Manning, who was sen-
tenced to 35 years in prison following treatment in pre-trial detention that has been
described as excessive and unfair.171
In the light of the strong disincentives to conscientiously disclose information deemed
confidential by government agencies, an appropriate legal framework providing adequate
protection for whistle-blowers needs to be designed in order to ensure that the govern-
ment remains in check. The legal framework must contain clear standards addressing
when an individual can disclose confidential information.172 While it might make
sense to treat whistle-blowers differently when national security is implicated,173 the
grave implications of unchecked and opaque intelligence agencies mean that some
whistle-blower protection is essential. It is contended that a three-step system strikes
the appropriate balance between secrecy and transparency in the surveillance
context.174 A three-step system requires a whistle-blower to report the suspected wrong-
doing using internal procedures initially. This is important as it favours the internal
reporting and correcting of issues and avoids any risk of harming national security or hin-
dering operational effectiveness. If the internal reporting is unsuccessful, the whistle-
blower can approach an external party, such as a regulator or an ombudsman. This
body must be fully independent of the executive branch of government. If the organis-
ation fails to respond adequately at this stage, the whistle-blower must then have the
option to approach the public, most usually through the press.
While internal reporting along a prescribed channel is of course preferable as the stan-
dard first step – particularly in the surveillance context – fully internal and closed reporting
systems have inherent flaws. This is particularly true where the whistle-blower aims to dis-
close an ‘unlawful secret’ that has received approval from those in power.175 When the
illegal secret is endorsed by senior officials, it is highly unlikely that the act of whistle-
blowing is likely to effect change. Vladec points out that these are the most important
cases to expose.176 Due to the heightened stakes in the security context, it is prudent to
establish a robust second step channel for whistle-blowers. An independent and expert
170T McCarthy, ‘Snowden Unlikely to “Man up” in Face of Espionage Act, Legal Adviser Says’ The
Guardian (London 28 May 2014) <www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/28/snowden-return-us-
kerry-face-charges-espionage> accessed 10 October 2014.
171Ibid; G Greenwald, ‘Even a Military Judge Recognizes What Many Progressives Denied: Bradley
Manning Was Mistreated’ The Guardian (London 9 January 2013) <http://www.theguardian.com/
commentisfree/2013/jan/09/bradley-manning-wikileaks-mistreated-progressives> accessed 10
October 2014.
172L Paquette, ‘The Whistleblower as Underdog: What Protection can Human Rights Offer in
Massive Secret Surveillance?’ (2013) 17 IJHR 796, 802.
173R Moberly, ‘Whistleblowers and the Obama Presidency: The National Security Dilemma’ (2012)
16 EREPJ 51, 116.
174For a general discussion of three step whistle-blower protection see, W Vandekerckhove, ‘Euro-
pean Whistleblower Protection: Tiers or Tears?’ in D Lewis (ed), A Global Approach to Public Inter-
est Disclosure (Edward Elgar, 2010) 15–35. Vandekerckhove discusses the three-tiered model of
whistle-blower protection in the European context.
175S Vladec, ‘The Espionage Act and National Security Whistleblowing AfterGarcetti’ (2008) 57 Am
ULR 1531, 1544.
176Ibid 1544.
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regulator will be able to exert scrutiny over the complaints, while maintaining a high level
of secrecy.
In spite of the importance of providing this second step option, it is contended that pro-
tection of whistle-blowers who are compelled to go to the press remains essential. History
has demonstrated that the press can provide a vital outlet for the frustrated whistle-blower.
Before Daniel Ellsberg went to the press with the Pentagon Papers, he approached legis-
lators in an effort to ignite a debate. After initial enthusiasm from two Senators,177 both
Senators backed out citing the political risk.178 Following this lack of success, Ellsberg
approached the press even though he knew this action could result in his imprisonment
for many years.179 Without building in legal protection for situations where the whistle-
blower is compelled to resort to the fourth estate, any legislation is likely to have only sym-
bolic value.180
Conclusion
The Snowden disclosures have created an ‘international furore and raised concerns from
the population far afield from the US.’181 It has been reported that in spite of a signifi-
cant amount of global ‘activity’ – such as parliamentary inquiries, diplomatic represen-
tations and media coverage – following the Snowden revelations, an insignificant
number of tangible reforms have been introduced.182 In spite of the erratic response
to the revelations across the world, it is clear that the institutions of the EU have
been comparatively active in their responses.183 This article has discussed how the
right to privacy and the right to protection of personal data have received increased
focus in the wake of the Snowden revelations. Most striking has been the case law of
the Court of Justice. The Court of Justice has often played a crucial role in charting
the course for the European Union, and cases such as Digital Rights Ireland and
Google Spain indicate that data protection and privacy are to be key issues on the EU
agenda in the coming years.
This article opened with the observation that the pendulum metaphor can provide a
useful illustration of the manner in which public opinion tends to oscillate between
favouring greater security and greater privacy. Triggering events – such as terrorist
attacks – can heighten this effect and government policy tends to respond to these
177Ellsberg first approached Senator William Fulbright and then approached Senator George
McGovern.
178A Greenberg, This Machine Kills Secrets: Julian Assange, the Cypherpunks, and Their Fight to
Empower Whistleblowers (Penguin, 2012) 35.
179Ibid.
180In addition to requiring a comprehensive legal structure, appropriate technological supports will
also be necessary in order to create a system where harmful covert behaviour can be safely and effi-
ciently exposed by genuine insiders. Greenberg argues that ‘WikiLeaks’ key advancement in the
science of spilling information has been in separating the leaker from the leaked information.’ The
logic behind this argument is that buffering the source of the leak from the confidential information
encourages disclosure. A Greenberg, This Machine Kills Secrets: Julian Assange, the Cypherpunks,
and Their Fight to Empower Whistleblowers (Penguin, 2012) 5–6.
181L Paquette, ‘The whistleblower as underdog: what protection can human rights offer in massive
secret surveillance?’ (2013) 17 IJHR 796, 798.
182S Davies, ‘ACrisis of Accountability’ The Privacy Surgeon (June 2014) 5 <https://cippic.ca/uploads/
Snowden_at_one_year-global_survey.pdf> accessed 10 October 2014.
183Ibid 7.
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shifts in public opinion. There was an increase in intrusive surveillance measures during
the Cold War era and a surge in support for privacy protections following the Watergate
scandal and the Church Committee Report. The delayed response to the Cold War sur-
veillance techniques is representative of surveillance reform in general. The clandestine
nature of surveillance can postpone the counteracting shifts in opinion that support
greater privacy until the cloak of secrecy is pierced. Accordingly, shifts in opinion in
favour of greater privacy will often only occur after a scandal or leak. Moreover, the
intermittent and often incomplete nature of unauthorised disclosures is likely to lessen
the force of the corrective swing in public opinion due to inertia caused by public
uncertainty.
Due to this difficulty, this article rejects Etzioni’s claim that once the threat has passed,
the intrusive measures ‘can gradually be rolled back.’184 Due to the norm of secrecy in the
surveillance context, the public will rarely know if a threat has actually passed or even what
measures need to be rolled back. Accordingly, this article suggests that mandating the
regular reporting of transparent and comprehensive surveillance statistics provides the
public with increased control over their governments without threatening security. By
increasing transparency, civil society can track government activity and provide a more
consistent check than that possible through reliance on unauthorised disclosures. In spite
of this, however, this article acknowledges the importance of whistle-blowers as a crucial
final line of defence against nefarious government activity.
184A Etzioni, The Limits of Privacy (Basic Books, 1999) 25.
Information & Communications Technology Law 219
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [M
ay
no
oth
 U
niv
ers
ity
 L
ibr
ary
] a
t 0
8:4
1 2
4 O
cto
be
r 2
01
7 
